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INTEGRATED PRETRIAL ATTACK ON A PLEADING:
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF MICHIGAN'S NEW
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULE
Carl S. Hawkins* and Brett R. Dick**
I. Introduction
Modern procedural reforms reflect diminished confidence in the de-
murrer or "no cause" motion as a device to dispose of non-meritorious
claims before trial.1 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, setting the
pattern of reform for many states,2 abolished the demurrer. Although a
preliminary attack upon the legal sufficiency of the complaint is still
permitted by a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12 (b) (6), 3 the
challenged pleading may be amended as a matter of course,4 to minimize
the risk that a good claim might be lost because it was poorly pleaded.5
The risk that sham amendments might then be used to forestall dismissal
of a claim lacking factual support6 is offset by the motion for summary
judgment under Federal Rule 56, which enables the movant to penetrate
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1948, Brigham Young
University; LL.B. 1951, Northwestern University.
**Mr. Dick is a member of the staff of Prospectus.
'See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 127-33 (1965); Pike, Objections to Pleadings under the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L.J. 50 (1937); Weinstein, Proposed
Revision of New York Practice, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 74-75 (1960); Note, The
Pleading and Demurrer Problems Re-Examined-New Proposals in New York, 60
COLUM.L.REV. 1015 (1960).2 See 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§9-9.53 (Wright
Ed. 1960). The authors point out that Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming have rules of civil procedure substantially the same as the Federal
Rules. Florida, Iowa, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas, and South Dakota all draw
heavily on the Federal Rules.
3 A study made in 1962 indicated that motions under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) were made in
only about five per cent of all cases and resulted in a final termination of the action in
only two per cent of all cases. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 242 (1963).
4FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
5 See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §66 at 234 (1963).6F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §4.1 at 128:
But all too often lawyers are willing to keep cases alive
hopefully by adding allegations to the pleadings which
may turn out not to be provable at trial. They will do this
at least where the alternative is sudden death to their
case through a ruling on demurrer.
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the formal allegations of the pleading by resort to affidavits, documents,
and other extrinsic proof.7 This shift toward reliance on summary judg-
ment to dispose of unworthy claims was furthered by a 1948 amendment
to Federal Rule 12, which provides that a motion to dismiss may be
converted into a motion for summary judgment, if matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.8
This trend was carried one step further in the Michigan General
Court Rules, adopted in 1963.9 Under the name of a motion for summa-
ry judgment, Rule 11710 combines (1) the former motion to dismiss for
See also id. at 230 (1965). Provisions such as FED. R. Civ. P. I I and MICH. GEN.
CT. R. 114.2 (1963) which make the lawyer's signature a certificate of good faith,
with disciplinary action for willful violation, have apparently never been an adequate
deterrent to unfounded pleading. See IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §332.1 at 268 (Wright ed. 1960); VERIFICATION & CERTIFI-
CATION OF PLEADINGS, 1957 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE
COURTS 269, 284 (N.Y. Legis. Doc. 6b). Since 1931, Michigan has had a provision
authorizing imposition of costs of proof, including attorneys' fees, as a penalty for
unwarranted denials in a pleading. MICH. CT. R. 17 § 10 (193 1); See Sunderland, The
New Michigan Court Rules, 29 MICH. L. REV. 586, 590 (1931). Yet there has been
no reported instance of the imposition of sanctions under the rule. In 1963, the
provision was expanded to authorize the same sanction for unwarranted allegations in
a complaint. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 111.6 (1963). In one recent case the court of
appeals upheld the allowance of attorney fees incurred in defending an allegation of
conspiracy which was made without any basis in fact. Fredal v. Forster, 9 Mich.
App. 215, 156 N.W.2d 606 (1967).
7 See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §99 at 385 (1963).
8
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b):
... [ilf, on a motion ... to dismiss for failure of the plead-
ing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable oppor-
tunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56.
Rule 12(c) contains an identical provision as to a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
9 MICH. G. CT. R. (1963) [hereinafter cited as GCR 1963].
10 GCR 1963, Rule 117, Motion for Summary Judgment
.2 Grounds. The motion for summary judgment shall
state that the moving party is entitled to judgment in his
favor because of any one of the following grounds:
(I) the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
(2) the opposing party has failed to state a valid defense
to the claim asserted against him.
(3) that except as to the amount of damages there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving
party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
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failure to state a cause of action, 1 ' (2) the former motion for judgment on
the pleadings or to strike an invalid defense, 12 and (3) the traditional
motion for summary judgment based upon the absence of a genuine
issue of fact.' 3 As explained in the official Committee Comments, the
purpose of this provision was to make available
a motion procedure by which to obtain
early dismissal of actions brought without
merit, while precluding misuse of the proce-
dure for purely dilatory purposes.... These
rules allow affidavits to be filed with the mo-
tion so that the court at the hearing may
delve beneath mere pleading allegations and
determine the motion on the basis of the ac-
tual facts. Submitting matter outside the
pleadings in this way has been referred to as
the 'speaking demurrer,' and the procedure is
a departure from the old demurrer at common
law. Proper use of the speaking demurrer pre-
vents the plaintiff who has no cause of action
from being kept alive by an evasively worded
amendment which technically covers up the
defect objected to. The affidavits will show in
such a case that there exist no facts upon
which to base an action. It is felt that more
use ought to be made of the affidavit hearing
on a motion to dismiss and less use made of
the motion as a dilatory tactic, pure and
simple.... If it is wise to provide that the
submission of affidavits will convert a motion
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings
into a motion for summary judgment, [as in
.3 Motions and Proceedings Thereon. A motion based
upon sub-rule 117.2(3) shall be supported by affidavits,
and the opposing party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits.... Such affidavits together
with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and docu-
mentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by
the parties shall be considered by the court at the hear-
ing. Each party shall be given an opportunity to amend
his pleadings ... unless the evidence then before the
court shows amendment would not be justified ...
"MICH. C. R. 17 §7 (1945): "... whenever any pleading... is deemed to be insufficient in
substance, a motion to dismiss, or to strike, or for judgment on the pleading, may be
made...."
12 Id.
"3id. at 30 §7. GCR 1963 Rule 117 makes some changes as to when the motion for
summary judgment may be made, the necessity for affidavits, and procedure when
partial summary judgment is granted. See I J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN
COURT RULES ANNOTATED Rule 117, Authors' Comments at 357-58 (1962).
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the Federal Rules] then why not combine all
three motions in one rule and call it a summa-
ry judgment rule?
1 4
This statement of purpose overlooks potential difficulties arising from
the significantly different function of the several grounds which are
combined under the single rule. The "no cause" and "no valid defense"
grounds are addressed to the legal sufficiency of the pleadings on their
face, whereas the traditional motion for summary judgment assumes the
legal sufficiency of a pleading and challenges its factual support by resort
to extrinsic proof. Our study 15 indicates that confusion has in fact
resulted from the attempt to integrate these functions under Michigan's
new summary judgment rule, and that clarifying amendments are
needed, if the rule is to achieve its intended purpose.
II. Experience Under the New Michigan Rule
It is quite apparent from the many appeals
involving the grant or denial of motions for
summary judgment which this Court has re-
ceived in recent months, and is receiving, that
there is a disturbing misapprehension among
members of the bench and bar concerning the
propriety of preemptory disposition of cases
by summary judgment prior to trial as pro-
vided by our recently adopted rule, GCR
1963, 117.16
From 1963 through 1967, appeals involving some issue under the new
summary judgment rule were reported in more than seventy-five cases.17
Most of these appeals concern issues which would have arisen even if
the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment had been
14 FINAL REPORT, JOINT COMMITTEE ON MICHIGAN PROCEDURAL REVISION, PART 11,
PROPOSED COURT RULES AND COMMENTS 54 (1960); reprinted in I J. HONIGMAN &
C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED Rule 117, Committee Com-
ment, at 354 (1962).
15 This study was limited to an appraisal of how the rule is working, as measured by
reported appellate decisions. It would also be useful to know how the rule is actually
working at the trial court level, but we do not presently have data available to support
any such analysis.
16Durant v. Stahlin, 375 Mich. 628, 642, 135 N.W.2d 392, 396 (1965) (concurring
opinion).
17 Most of the cases are digested in the 1967 pocket part of I J. HONIGMAN & C.
HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED Rule 117, Michigan decisions
(1962); see also cases cited in note 18 infra.
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separated, as in former Michigan practice.' 8 But a few of the cases
indicate serious dfficulty attributable to the integrating feature of the
new rule.' 9
A. Confusion over Function of Motion
The apparent source of difficulty is confusion over which function of
the rule has been invoked by an ambiguous motion. Sub-rule 117.220
requires that,"The motion for summary judgment shall state" on which
of the three grounds "the moving party is entitled to judgment". Sub-rule
117.321 further prescribes that supporting and opposing affidavits are to
be used only in connection with a motion grounded on sub-rule 117.2
(3), to show the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Despite these
provisions, motions have been filed, with supporting affidavits tending to
challenge the factual genuineness of a pleading, when the only stated
ground in the motion itself is that of sub-rule 117.2 (1) or (2), the failure
to state a legally valid claim or defense.
22
18 Many of the cases involve only the "demurrer" or "no cause" facet of the rule. E.g.,
Blades v. Genesee County Drain Dist. No. 2, 375 Mich. 683, 135 N.W.2d 420
(1965); Boden v. Thompson-Brown Co., 373 Mich. 243, 129 N.W.2d 872 (1964);
Professional Facilities Corp. v. Marks, 373 Mich. 673, 131 N.W.2d 60 (1964); Flynn
v. Brownell, 371 Mich. 19, 123 N.W.2d 153 (1963); Joseph v. Township of Grand
Blanc, 5 Mich.App. 566, 147 N.W. 2d 458 (1967); Goodar Inv. Co. v. Detroit Bank
& Trust Co., 4 Mich.App. 218, 144 N.W.2d 649 (1966). Legal sufficiency of defense:
Minor-Dietiker v. Mary Jane Stores of Mich., Inc., 2 Mich.App. 585, 141 N.W.2d
342 (1966); Lee v. Fidelity Life & Income Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Mich.App. 82, 138
N.W.2d 545 (1965).
-Another group involve traditional summary judgment questions, such as the
sufficiency of affidavits: E.g., Durant v. Stahlin, 375 Mich. 628, 135 N.W.2d 392
(1965); Durant v. Stahlin, 374 Mich. 82, 130 N.W.2d 910 (1964); Hirych v. State
Fair Comm'n., 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1965); People ex rel. F. Yeager
Bridge & Culvert Co. v. Cooke Contracting Co., 372 Mich. 563, 127 N.W.2d 308
(1964); Hoehner v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 8 Mich.App. 708, 155 N.W.2d 231
(1967); Weiler v. Heuple, 4 Mich.App. 654, 145 N.W.2d 352 (1966); Christy v.
Detroit Edison Co., 2 Mich.App. 730, 141 N.W.2d 368 (1966); Green v. Lundquist
Agency, Inc., 2 Mich.App. 488, 140 N.W.2d 575 (1966); Dionne v. Pierson Con-
tacting Co., 2 Mich.App. 134, 138 N.W.2d 555 (1965); the fact-law distinction: E.g.,
Green v. Wallace, 376 Mich. 113, 135 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Miller v. Miller, 373
Mich. 519, 129 N.W.2d 885 (1964); Beardsley v. R. J. Manning Co., 2 Mich.App.
172, 139 N.W.2d 129 (1966); and whether there is a genuinely disputed issue of fact:
E.g., McCoy v. De Liefde, 376 Mich. 198, 135 N.W.2d 916 (1965); Brooks v. Fields,
375 Mich. 667, 135 N.W.2d 346 (1965); Zamler v. Smith, 375 Mich. 675, 135
N.W.2d 349 (1965); Tripp v. Dziwankoski, 375 Mich. 619, 134 N.W.2d 671 (1965);
Ross Indus. Chem. Co. v. Smith, 5 Mich.App. 422, 146 N.W.2d 816 (1966); Bielski
v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 2 Mich.App. 501, 140 N.W.2d 772 (1966).
19 See notes 24-35 infra.
20See note 10 supra.
21 Id.
2 See notes 24-28 infra.
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If the opposing party takes the motion at face value, as attacking only
the legal sufficiency of his pleading, he risks having summary judgment
entered against him for failing to counter the mover's supporting
affidavits.2 3 On the other hand, if he counters with affidavits out of an
abundance of caution, when only a challenge to his legal theory was
intended, effort and money have been wasted.
In one case 24 to recover past rent, plaintiff moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that
... defendants' answer fails to state a valid
defense, and the defendants have not denied
any of the material matters alleged in the
complaint, but only such immaterial matters
not pertinent to the issues and not con-
stituting a defense to the plaintiff's claim.
[Emphasis from cited source].
2 5
The motion was supported by affidavits. Defendant offered to amend his
answer but did not file opposing affidavits, in consequence of which
summary judgment was granted against him. The court of appeals
affirmed. Judge Levine dissented, stating that, "In my opinion the
ground stated in plaintiff's motion is that expressed in GCR 1963,
117.2(2)-failure to state a valid defense, and not (3)-absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact." 26 It may be that the defendant in
fact had no defense to the plaintiff's claim, but it is also possible that he
lost the opportunity to prove a meritorious defense because he was
misled as to the function of plaintiff's motion.
Another recent decision 27 makes it clear that the opposing party
cannot safely rely on the ground expressly stated in the text of a motion
for summary judgment. Retired policemen and firemen suing to recover
deficiencies in pension benefits were met with a motion for summary
judgment, "on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted." 28 The motion was supported by affidavits
purporting to show that the alleged deficiencies were accounted for by a
change in the method of computing benefits authorized by a 1957
amendment in the law. Plaintiffs responded by filing an amended com-
plaint which itemized their claimed deficiencies in greater detail, but
23 See Justice Souris' concurring opinion in Durant v. Stahlin, 375 Mich. 628, 643-45, 135
N.W.2d 392 404-07 (1965), for an authoritative statement on the need to file oppos-
ing affidavits.
24Jefferson Maintenance Co. v. Detroit Electrotype Co., 7 Mich.App. 619, 152 N.W.2d
699 (1967).
25 Id. at 625-26, 152 N.W.2d at 702.
26 Id. at 625, 152 N.W.2d at 701.
27 Retired Policemen and Firemen v. City of Lincoln Park, 6 Mich.App. 372, 149 N.W.2d
206 (1967).
28 Id. at 375, 149 N.W.2d at 207.
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they were dismissed for failure to counter the defendant's affidavits. The
court may have been right in concluding that the defendant's affidavits
were intended to show that the only real dispute was an issue of law as
to the applicability of the 1957 amendment. But there remains a nagging
concern that the plaintiffs might have taken the motion at face value, as
attacking only the formal sufficiency of their pleading, and failed to
substantiate a fact issue because they assumed that they were not yet
required to do so.
Thus the present application of Rule 117 has led to situations in which
a meritorious claim or defense might have been lost due to procedural
confusion. 29 Admittedly there is some reason to be suspicious about the
factual merit of the defeated claim or defense in the cases discussed. But
summary judgment should be based upon more than suspicion and a
supporting affidavit. It should be granted only when the opposing party
has failed to substantiate an issue in response to a motion clearly
invoking that provision of the rule which requires him to do so.
Losing a meritorious claim or defense by procedural mistake is not the
only hazard in an ambiguous motion for summary judgment. Even if the
ultimate merits are saved, time and court resources may be wasted over
the confusing motion, as illustrated in two recent court of appeals
cases.30 In one case,3 ' where the defendants moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, the apparent confusion of the litigants was
reflected in a stipulation that the court could consider "all of the plead-
ings, interrogatories and depositions presently on file... in making their
[sic] determination as to whether the plaintiffs have stated their cause of
action."'3 2 The trial judge accepted the invitation, resolved factual issues
in favor of the defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint. The
court of appeals reversed, stating that the judge should not have gone
beyond the pleadings. "Interrogatories and depositions are relevant only
2
9 See also Zimmerman v. Stahlin, 374 Mich. 93, 130 N.W.2d 915 (1964). The complaint
alleged publication of a defamatory letter by the defendants. One defendant moved
for summary judgment for failure to state a cause of action and added that plaintiffs
statements were conclusions of law and did not allege any overt act by the defendant
in connection with the alleged publication. Defendant's affidavit filed with the motion
specifically denied any involvement in connection with the publication. Plaintiff
requested leave to amend and filed an unsworn response to the motion, in which he
reasserted generally the truth of his pleaded allegations. The supreme court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant because of plaintiff's failure to counter defend-
ant's affidavits. It is impossible to tell from the reported decision whether plaintiff
failed to file supporting affidavits because he thought he was facing a "no cause"
motion only, or whether he failed because he did not have any proof to support his
claim. His motion to amend may have been a ploy to perpetuate an unfounded claim,
but it is also possible that he was dismissed because of procedural confusion.
3 0 See notes 31 and 34 infra.
31 Drouilliard v. City of Roseville, 9 Mich.App. 239, 156 N.W.2d 628, (1967).
32 Id. at 242, 156 N.W.2d at 630.
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if the ground stated for summary judgment is that there is no genuine
issue of material fact-not if it is asserted that the pleading fails to state
a claim or defense."33 However, in another case3 4 the same year, where
it was urged that the trial judge erred in considering more than the
pleadings in granting summary judgment for failure to state a claim, the
court of appeals reversed but "decline[d] to pass on what a trial court
is to consider in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under GCR
1963, 117.2 (1) beyond stating that the entire rule 117 controls."3 - in
the former case,3 6 an appeal was needed to correct the trial judge's error
in going beyond the pleadings on a "no cause" motion. The same
problem produced an appeal in the latter case,3 7 and, because of the
appellate court's refusal to resolve the confusion, the motion might still
have capacity for mischief on remand.
B. Failure to Utilize Advantages of Rule
One advantage of Michigan's integrated summary judgment rule is its
potential for dealing with conclusory pleadings. Yet it appears that this
potential has not been fully utilized.
For example, two cases were recently dismissed on motions for sum-
mary judgment because necessary elements of the claims were pleaded
in conclusory terms. In the one complaint for malicious prosecution,
lack of "probable cause" was alleged only as a bare conclusion.3 8 In the
other action, an injunction was claimed on the conclusory assertion of
"arbitrary" administrative action.3 9 Since defendant's motions for sum-
mary judgment were not supported by affidavits, they were necessarily
grounded on failure to state a cause of action, and the complaints were
dismissed because of defective pleading.
Conclusory allegations might be used to conceal the absence of spec-
ific facts needed to support a valid claim or defense. 40 However, summa-
ry dismissal of a conclusory or vague pleading risks injustice to a litigant
who has a good claim or defense in fact, but whose lawyer has failed to
3 Id. at 244, 156 N.W.2d at 631.
34 Dunnan & Jeffery, Inc. v. Gross Telecasting, Inc., 7 Mich.App. 113, 151 N.W.2d 194,
(1967).
ld. at 118, 151 N.W.2d at 197.
36 See note 31 supra.
37 See note 34 supra.
38 Harris v. Federal Asphalt Prod. Co., I Mich.App. 316, 136 N.W.2d 43 (1965).
39 Hiers v. Brownell, 376 Mich. 225, 136 N.W.2d 10 (1965).
40
F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §2.13 at 95 (1965).
The pleader may wish to conceal weaknesses in his case
behind the generality of his allegations and thus to pre-
vent dismissal at an early stage, so as to prolong the
period when the case will have a nuisance value for
settlement.
[Vol. 2:2
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state it artfully.4 ' The latter concern should clearly outweigh whatever
annoyance is caused by tolerating conclusory pleadings.4 2 If such a
pleading fails "reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of
the cause he is called upon to defend," 4 it can be quickly remedied by
use of expedient discovery devices, 44 or by a motion for a more definite
statement. 45 If an unsupportable claim is made, it is best exposed by a
motion for summary judgment which demands a showing of proof.46
Therefore, it would be better for the court to overrule a motion which
challenges only the legal sufficiency of such a pleading,4 7 thereby in-
ducing defendants to use the integrated summary judgment procedure.
Then if the plaintiff in fact has a case, he will have the opportunity to
redeem it by showing factual support for his conclusory allegations. If he
41See id. at 94-99; 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 812 at 1687 et seq. (1960); C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §68 at 248-49 (1963); C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 226,
233-36, 244-45 (1947).
4 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §2.13 at 98 (1965).
There are other devices for promoting administrative
efficiency which probably do so better than special plead-
ing can and which do not carry the same threat to sub-
stantive justice. The full discovery provisions of modem
procedural systems make possible a nearly complete in-
terchange of relevant information from those who ac-
tually have had it at first hand. The summary judgment
device enables an adversary to pierce the pleader's alle-
gations (whether general or detailed) and thus dispose of
a nuisance suit which the pleader cannot back with
sworn statements.
43 This is the standard by which the sufficiency of a complaint is to be judged in Michigan.
GCR 1963, 111.1(1). For a perceptive explanation of this provision as intended to
shift Michigan pleading from the "formulary" standard of code pleading to a more
liberal "notice" standard, see Sunderland, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915, 14
MICH. L. REV. 441, 551-53 (1916). It is doubtful that the Harris and Hiers cases,
supra notes 37 and 38, were really deficient by this standard. Their dismissal is an
example of the unfortunate tendency to regress to stricter rules of pleading "in
actions which are disfavored for real or supposed reasons of policy."
4GCR 1963, 309 (interrogatories to parties); GCR 1963, 312'(requests for-admission).
See 2 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED Rule
309, Authors' Comments at 157 (1963).
4GCR 1963, 115.1. See I J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES
ANNOTATED Rule 115, Authors' Comments at 283-85.
4GCR 1963, 117.2(3).47 Ortiz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 Mich.App. 548, 140 N.W.2d 791 (1966) was an action on
a settlement agreement, in which it was alleged that the adjuster who made the oral
offer was an "agent" of the defendant insurer. Although this was a "conclusory"
allegation, the court properly held that it was good enough and had to be taken as true
in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was based only on GCR
1963, 117.2(1), the "no cause" facet of the rule, with no supporting affidavits. If the
claim was factually vulnerable on the agency allegation, the defendant could have
quickly exposed that defect by affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment
under GCR 1963, 117.2(3).
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cannot do so, summary judgment will be granted with confidence thai
the pleader has not been dismissed for errors of form.
48
Ill. Resolution of the Problem
A. Comparison with Federal and New York Rules
The confusion and difficulty encountered with the Michigan rule in-
vites comparison with analagous integrating provisions of the Federal
and New York rules.
The Federal Rules guard against confusion by placing under different
provisions the traditional motion for summary judgment4 9 and the mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 5° or for judgment on the
pleadings. 51 The latter motions may be converted into a motion for
summary judgment, if the court admits matter outside the pleadings,
5 2
thereby clearly signalling the shift in function.
By comparison with the Michigan rule, the only apparent dis-
advantage in the federal scheme is its failure to make an integrated
attack available as a matter of right.53 In practice, however, it appears
that the federal courts have freely converted the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment when there was any advantage to be
gained.54 Therefore, Michigan's difficulties might be remedied by re-
verting to the Federal Rules, except that adoption of Federal Rule 12
would upset other features of Michigan's pre-trial motion pattern which
48 GCR 1963, 13: "These rules are to be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action so as to avoid the consequences of any
error or defect in the proceedings which does not affect substantial rights of the
parties."
GCR 1963, 110.3: "...[T]he form and sufficiency of all ... pleadings shall be
determined by these rules, construed and enforced to secure a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of all controversies on their merits."
49 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.50 Id. 12(b)(6).
51 Id. 12(c).
52 See note 8 supra.
53 The motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings may be converted into a motion
for summary judgment only if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) [Emphasis added]. This implies the
exercise of discretion by the court, at least in those cases where the opposing party
objects to the submission of matters outside the pleadings.
54 1 A. W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §349 at 314- 16
(Wright ed. 1960).
This convenient practice has been followed in innumer-
able cases. Perhaps there is an occasional case where the
court will refuse to consider affidavits and other such
materials presented to it, and will insist on considering
the motion on the face of the pleadings, but such cases
are rare indeed.
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differ from federal practice. 55 Such disrupting changes should be unnec-
essary, if the clarity of the Federal Rule can be attained within the
framework of Michigan's existing rule, as we believe it can.
The New York rules of civil procedure attempt to resolve the delaying
amendment problem in two ways. First, under New York Civ. Prac. §
3211,56 either party may submit evidence on a motion to dismiss a
legally deficient claim or defense, but the court still retains discretion, as
under Federal Rule 12 (b) (6), to treat the motion as one for summary
judgment. It is, therefore, not entirely clear whether the moving party
can fully invoke the advantage of an integrated attack as a matter of
right.
57
Secondly, if the court grants the motion challenging the legal
sufficiency of a pleading only, the New York rule permits it to require
the opposing party to submit evidence to show "good ground to sup-
port" his amendment, before any further pleading will be allowed.58
55 A much wider range of defenses can be raised preliminarily by motion under GCR 1963,
1,16.1 and 117.2 than under FED R. Civ. P. 12(b). There are also differences in the
"waiver" provisions. See GCR 1963, 116.2, and compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g)-(h).
Nothing in the present study indicates the need for revising these features of Mich-
igan practice to conform with the Federal Rules.
5 6 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §3211 (McKinny 1968). Motion to Dismiss.
(a) Motion to dismiss cause of action. A party may move
for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action
asserted against him on the ground that:
7. The pleading fails to state a cause of action;...
(b) Motion to dismiss defense. A party may move for
judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground
that a defense is not stated or has no merit.
(c) Evidence permitted; immediate trial; motion treated
as one for summary judgment. Upon the hearing of a
motion made under subdivision (a) or (b), either party
may submit any evidence that could properly be consid-
ered on a motion for summary judgment and the court
may treat the motion as a motion for summary judg-
ment....
57 It has been suggested that it may make no difference whether the court treats it as a
motion for summary judgment, since it will have substantially the same effect as a
speaking motion under Rule 3211. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 3211.50 (1967).5 8 N.Y. CIv. PRAc. §3211 (McKinney 1968). Motion to Dismiss.
(e) ... [M]otion to plead over .... [W]here a motion is
macle on the ground set forth in paragraph seven of
subdivision (a), or on the ground that a defense is not
stated, if the opposing party desires leave to plead again
in the event the motion is granted, he shall so state in his
opposing papers and may set forth evidence that could
properly be considered in a motion for summary judg-
ment in support of a new pleading; leave to plead again
shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the
Prospectus
While this provision was aimed directly at the delaying amendment
problem, 59 that salutary objective is still left to the court's discretion and
may not be achieved if supporting proof is not required. On the other
hand, if outside proof is required when the successful motion to dismiss
attacks only the legal sufficiency of the pleading, the amending process is
made unduly restrictive. If the factual support for a pleading has not
been challenged, why should a showing of factual support be required to
justify an amendment repairing a legal defect? Legal defects in the other
party's pleading may be corrected by amendment without any such
restriction. 0
There is the further disadvantage under the New York rule that an
additional hearing may be necessary to determine whether leave to
amend should be granted. If the moving party submits outside proof,
but the opposing party does not, the court may grant the motion to
dismiss and then require the opposing party to submit evidence in
support of his offered amendments.6 1 This may, in effect, require the
same number of hearings as would have been required if the moving
party had proceeded in the traditional way - i.e., if he had first chal-
lenged successfully the legal sufficiency of the pleading and was then
required to counter a delaying amendment with a motion for summary
judgment. In other words, the requirement for substantiation of the
amendment prior to leave to amend may cause the same delay as if there
were no integrated motion available and the factual sufficiency had to be
tested by a separate summary judgment motion. The rule may even
require a third hearing, for if leave to amend is granted, the original party
may still move for summary judgment under New York Civ. Prac.
§3212.62 Since court time is a precious commodity, we prefer the Mich-
igan approach, which points toward the disposition of an integrated
attack on a single hearing.
B. Proposed Amendment of the Michigan Rule
Ideally the procedure for allowing an integrated challenge to the legal
and factual merit of a pleading should have the following features:
opposing party had good ground to support his cause of
action or defense; the court may require the party seek-
ing leave to plead again to submit evidence to justify the
granting of such leave.
59 4 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, 3211.01 (1967).
60 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §3025 (McKinney 1968).
r" Id. §3211 (e).
62 It is doubtful that a party would move for summary judgment under Rule 3212 at this
point, since the court has for all intents and purposes ruled that the complaint has
factual sufficiency. However, the possibility is not necessarily precluded.
[Vol. 2:2
Pretrial Pleading Attack
(1) The moving party should be required to make sufficiently clear
which function or combination of functions he is invoking. This is
essential to avoid:
(a) the possible injustice of ruling against a party who fails to
respond to outside proof, believing that only a legal attack was in-
tended; or
(b) the waste of responding to outside proof when only a legal
attack is intended.
(2) The rule should make it clear that, (a) if only a legal attack is
involved, no greater specificity is required of the pleading than is pre-
scribed by the general rules of pleading; whereas, (b) if an integrated
attack is invoked, specific factual support for the pleading must be
shown to avoid summary judgment.
(3) An integrated attack or combination motion should be expressly
authorized, so as to invite attention to its advantages and permit its use
as a matter of right.
(4) The prescribed procedure should aim for disposition of an in-
tegrated attack on a single hearing, and should avoid involving the court
preliminarily in determining the function of a motion.
We believe these objectives can be achieved by amendments to the
existing Michigan rule, as set forth below:
63
Rule 117 Motion for Summary judgment
.1 [Unchanged]
.2 Grounds. The motion for summary judg-
ment shall state that the moving party is en-
titled to judgment in his favor because of any
one- of the following grounds:
(1) the opposing party has failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(2) the opposing party has failed to state
a valid defense to the claim asserted
against him,
(3) that except as to the amount of dam-
ages there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
A MOTION BASED UPON CLAUSE (1)
OR (2) OF THIS SUB-RULE MAY ALSO
INCLUDE A DEMAND FOR JUDG-
MENT BASED UPON CLAUSE (3), PRO-
63 The italicized portions contain the present language of Rule 117. The crossed-out words
are the proposed deletions, and the words printed in all capitals are the proposed
additions to the Rule.
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VIDED THAT THE MOTION CLEARLY
SPECIFIES EACH GROUND SEPA-
RA TELY.
.3 Motion and Proceedings Thereon. A mo-
tion based upon sub-rule 117.2(3) shall be
supported by affidavits, and the opposing
party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The affidavits submitted
by either party shall be governed by the pro-
visions of sub-rules 116.4, 116.5, and 116.6.
Such affidavits, together with the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and documentary
evidences then filed in the action or sub-
mitted by the parties shall be considered by
the court at the hearing. HOWEVER, IF
THE MOTION IS BASED ONLY UPON
CLAUSE (1) OR (2) OF SUB-RULE 117.2,
OR IF IT FAILS TO SPECIFY CLEARLY
THAT IT IS ALSO BASED UPON
CLAUSE (3) THEREOF, AFFIDAVITS
OR OTHER MATERIAL OUTSIDE
PLEADINGS SHALL NOT BE CONSID-
ERED BY THE COURT. IN RESPONSE
TO A MOTION BASED ONLY UPON
CLAUSE (1) OR (2) OF SUB-RULE 117.2,
THE COURT SHALL NOT REQUIRE
GREATER SPECIFICITY OF THE
PLEADINGS THAN IS PRESCRIBED BY
RULE 111, AND (e)ach party shall be given
opportunity to amend his pleadings as pro-
vided by Rule 118 unless the evidence then
be~fore the eouri shows amendment wou~ld fie
be- %j..fied. IN RESPONSE TO A MO-
TION EXPLICITLY BASED UPON
CLAUSE (3) OF SUB-RULE 117.2,
LEAVE TO AMEND THE PLEADING
ATTACKED SHALL BE ALLOWED
ONLY IF THE COURT IS SATISFIED,
FROM CONSIDERATION OF ALL MA-
TERIALS PRESENTED IN SUPPORT
OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO THE MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
THAT THE PROFFERED AMEND-
MENT WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT
FACTUAL SUPPORT SO AS TO RAISE A
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT. Judgment
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shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings
show that any party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law or if the affidavits or other
proof show that there is no genuine issue of
fact. If it appears that the opposing party
rather than the moving party is entitled to
judgment, the court may render summary
judgment in his favor without necessity of a
motion therefor.
.4 [Unchanged]
The word "one" is stricken from the first sentence of sub-rule 117.2,
prefacing the grounds for the motion, and a new sentence is added to
make perfectly clear that combination motions are authorized. The
frequently ignored mandate of the present rule, that the "motion... shall
state" its ground, is emphasized by a new proviso, that a combination
motion is permitted only if it "clearly specifies each ground separately."
This requirement is then enforced by adding to sub-rule 117.3 a direc-
tive that outside proof will not be considered if the motion does not
clearly specify a challenge to the pleading's factual support. In com-
bination, these provisions should adequately guard against surprise or
waste resulting from confusion over the function of a motion.
The proposed amendment to sub-rule 117.3 emphasizes the potential
advantages of a combination motion. A motion attacking only the legal
sufficiency of a pleading will not generally penetrate conclusory allega-
tions.6 4 And while amendments will continue to be allowed freely in
response to a motion challenging only the legal sufficiency of a pleading,
an integrated attack will be avoided by amendment only if the court is
satisfied that the proffered amendment has factual support and will raise
a genuine issue.
It is hoped that amendments such as those proposed will be adopted
to alleviate the problems discussed in this article and thus better achieve
the potential advantages of an integrated attack upon the legal and
factual merit of a pleading.
"This is the aim of the proposed amendment which provides that, in response to a
demurrer-type motion, "the court shall not require greater specificity of the pleadings
than is prescribed by Rule 111." Subrule 11,1 (1) requires only "such specific
averments as are necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of
the cause he is called upon to defend." Hopefully this will remind judges that a
motion for summary judgment based only on legal insufficiency should not result in
dismissal of a complaint whose only fault lies in the conclusory statement of some
necessary element of the claim. See text accompanying notes 37-47 supra.
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